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Abstract: 
 
How do international organizations influence domestic transparency? Studies 
typically contend that in order to be instrumental in promoting good government 
institutions, international organizations have to embody these norms in their own 
work. International organizations (IOs) have recently implemented a number of 
reforms to open up certain official documents and proceedings to public access. These 
reforms are generally expected to promote support for transparency in member 
countries. We suggest that one important and overlooked condition determines the 
ability of international organizations to meet these expectations: the quality of IO 
decision making, defined as its effectiveness, predictability and fairness. The paper 
develops these ideas theoretically and presents a study on how these reforms influence 
perceptions of the merits and drawbacks of transparency among senior government 
officials in environmental ministries, involved in projects seeking finance through the 
Clean Development Mechanisms and the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol.   
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Introduction 
 
Transparency has developed into a strong international norm. Article 19 of the 
universal declaration of human rights states that everyone has the right to “seek, receive, and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (UN 1948). 
Transparency is typically described as a necessary condition for better government quality 
and good governance (Islam 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2002; Kurtzman et al. 2004; IMF 2001; 
UNODC 2004). Despite the formidable increase in the attention that the principle of 
transparency has gained in recent years, from activists, research, business, international 
organizations and governments alike, many governments continue to rule largely in secrecy. 
The resistance against greater government transparency seems to be strong. At the same time, 
we know surprisingly little about what causes governments to change in favour of greater 
transparency. The focus of most studies has been what happens after transparency norms have 
been introduced to a country, i.e. on the effects of transparency. Less common is research on 
how to promote transparency in countries that have little of it (Grigorescu 2003).  
International organizations (IOs) are often expected to play an important role in 
persuading reluctant nation states to comply with international norms. A growing number of 
studies suggest that their success in promoting better government institutions is closely linked 
to whether or not international organizations embody these norms themselves in their dealings 
with member states (Grigorescu 2002; Woods 2000). This implies that greater IO 
transparency would lead to the spread of transparency norms in countries that interact with 
such international systems.  
In this paper, we suggest an alternative effect of IO transparency on participants 
in international systems. The paper argues that experiences with transparency in international 
systems can influence the way in which national bureaucrats who rely on IO decisions for 
their work perceive the merits and drawbacks of transparency. We build a model that shows 
that under certain circumstances IO transparency may lead to lower levels of support for 
transparency among national bureaucrats. In particular, the effects of IO transparency on 
personal experiences may hinge on one an important condition: the effectiveness, fairness and 
predictability of  IO decision making. We suggest that if the disclosure of information by IOs 
is perceived to indirectly or directly influence other crucial qualities in international 
organizations’ decision making, such as effectiveness and predictability, support for 
transparency may decrease. Particularly in controversial matters, IO transparency could lead 
to heavy and at times partial media reporting, which could influence the decision making 
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process. Thus if IO transparency reduces the impartiality of the decision making process, this 
may have a negative impact on the perceptions of the merits of transparency among national 
bureaucrats dependent upon these decisions. This, in turn, influences national bureaucrats’ 
experience of, and support for, transparency. 
 In this paper we outline the theory and the study that has been designed to 
explore these propositions launched in January 2010. This survey asks national bureaucrats 
who work with international systems about their experiences with the international system 
and their attitudes toward transparency. The bureaucrats are high-ranking officials from 
developing countries who work under two different international environmental treaties: the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Montreal Protocol. The two systems for international resource transfer 
studied – the CDM and the Multilateral Fund (MF) - differ in their level of effectiveness, and 
predictability and also in the level and type of mass medial attention that they receive. Due to 
the many controversies surrounding the CDM, information made available by the UNFCC has 
been used by the media and NGOs to criticize individual projects and the CDM system as a 
whole. This may give rise to differences in how national bureaucrats experience the merits, 
and drawbacks, of transparency.  
The paper thereby contributes towards placing the focus on the cognitive aspects 
of transparency reforms. Although the importance of perceptions of transparency of key 
bureaucrats is frequently mentioned in the literature (Piotrowski et al 2009; Neuman & 
Calland 2007; Gill & Hughes 2005; Florini 2002:4), studies within the norm diffusion 
literature tend to measure norm adoption as the implementation of laws. The drawbacks of 
this approach is, however, that the outcome of adopting new laws differ radically from one 
context to another, and that laws have little effect where political backing is lacking. We 
depart from this track to instead focus on how bureaucrats’ perceptions of transparency are 
influenced by their interactions with international organizations. The paper will also 
contribute to exploring the link between transparency and other decision making qualities. 
Although transparency is frequently seen as an integral part of well working government 
institutions, the way that these different qualities are linked to each other are not always clear 
nor given adequate attention in the literature  
Moreover, the paper will explore whether international systems primarily tasked 
with other objectives than spreading good governance norms can impact on principles such as 
transparency. Increasing evidence shows that the environmental integrity of international 
systems is closely linked to their domestic institutional effects. Although the CDM and the 
MF are concerned with the mitigation of environmentally hazardous gases rather than 
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promoting norms of good governance, participation in an international system represents a 
learning experience for national bureaucrats on the effect of the values and norms embodied 
in these systems.   
The paper will thereby critically examine the claim that IO transparency 
necessarily promotes greater domestic transparency. Although IO transparency reforms have a 
strong record for bringing about positive international change, their influence on domestic 
support for transparency reforms among governments should not be assumed let alone taken 
for granted. Thus, IO transparency can increase the societal pressure on governments to 
change (Grigorescu 2003), but may, under certain conditions, also influence the level of 
bureaucratic resistance against transparency reforms.   
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the study’s focus on 
perceptions of transparency among national bureaucrats seeking finance from international 
organizations. The second section discusses the various levels of transparency within IOs, and 
presents the two cases of the study. The third section outlines the paper’s theoretical 
framework and discusses how and why IO decision making quality, defined as its 
effectiveness and predictability influences national support for transparency among key 
bureaucrats. The fourth section outlines the study methodology and presents the survey sent to 
heads of the Designated National Authorities (DNAs) in the CDM system and the heads of the 
National Focal Points of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol in developing countries. The sixth section concludes. 
 
 
Government Support for Transparency 
The instrumental value of transparency is well-established in the literature 
(Stiglitz 2002). Transparency has been suggested as a cure against corruption (Rose-
Ackerman 1999; Reinikka and Svensson 2005; Montinola & Jackman 2002; Gerring & 
Thacker 2004; IMF 2001; UNODC 2004; Kaufmann et al. 2002), and an important condition 
for good governance (OECD 2001; Islam 2006) and growth (Kurtzman et al. 2004; Siegle 
2001). Given the benefits of transparency, it could be asked why more leaders have not 
implemented transparency and why some countries are backtracking on their commitments to 
an open society (Fenster 2006; Florini 2002). 
One answer is of course that bureaucrats may prefer secrecy if they have 
something to hide, so that they can proceed with corrupt acts. This answer only gives one part 
of the story, however, as it cannot be assumed that bureaucrats always have a preference to 
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act against the interest of citizens. Rather, many bureaucrats may have little to hide from the 
public, but still do not embrace the concept of transparency. This indicates that there are other 
costs associated with transparency that may not be immediately obvious. 
Where does the discontent toward transparency come from? To answer this 
question, we need to begin by understanding the term transparency. The first thing to note 
when it comes to transparency is that it is a multifaceted word, the meaning of which is at 
times misconstrued. The concept of transparency has been the subject of a number of studies 
in such varying fields as international security (Florini 2002), regime effectiveness (Mitchell 
1998), and negotiation theory (Stasavage 2004). It is perhaps because of the concept’s wide 
applicability that an agreed upon definition of transparency is lacking (Florini 2007; Relly & 
Sabharwal 2009). Studies on transparency have therefore suffered from confused 
terminology. Lindstedt and Naurin (forthcoming), for example, show that transparency is 
often conflated with accountability and Grigorescu (2003) points at difficulties in the 
operatinalization of the term.  
Given the confused terminology on transparency, we need to establish how 
transparency functions in practice in order to understand why governments would adopt this 
norm. The positive effects of transparency spring from providing the public with a link to 
decision makers. Public choice theory offers one model for understanding the normative logic 
of transparency by presenting governance as a principal-agent problem. Because the interests 
of agents and principals may diverge, principals must find ways of monitoring the actions 
taken by agents. Transparency could reduce this asymmetric information problem by 
shedding light on whether the agent (i.e. the government) is pursuing goals that are in the 
interest of principals (i.e. its citizens) effectively and efficiently (Florini 2002: 14-15). In 
other words, transparency could aid in overcoming the principal-agent problem by providing 
principals with information about actions taken by the agent on their behalf, which could be 
used to judge whether their interests are being served by the agent. Transparency can thus 
lead to good governance both by encouraging good public policy-making and by deterring 
abuses and mistakes by officials (Cary 2009). 
 Recently, however, studies have taken a more critical look at what transparency 
means in practice, revealing a number of costs and problems associated with its 
implementation (Lindstedt & Naurin forthcoming; Kolstad & Wiig 2009; Bastida & Benito 
2007; Fenster 2006; Stasavage 2004; MacCoun 2006). Rather than transparency being 
portrayed as a sure way to better government quality, these studies emphasise that 
transparency may not automatically provide the expected benefits.  
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In particular, transparency requires enabling factors such as free media and 
accountability mechanisms to function effectively (Lindstedt & Naurin forthcoming). Without 
these enabling conditions, greater transparency may for example increase the level of 
corruption in a country by making it more clear who can be bribed to attain something (Bac 
2001). Moreover, even when transparency works effectively, it can hinder efficient decision 
making, particularly in sensitive negotiations where delicate compromises are only likely to 
be reached if the public is not involved in polarizing the stances (Stasavage 2004). These 
studies have thus contributed to a more nuanced picture of transparency, moving past the 
characterization of transparency as a magic bullet that can solve a range of problems if 
implemented by governments. Instead, they emphasise that the benefits associated with 
transparency can only materialize when a range of conditions are in place.   
Thus while these studies have broadened our understanding of the concept of 
transparency, they do not provide an answer to how transparency is most effectively 
promoted. The studies that do analyse the expansion of transparency norms tend to narrowly 
focus on freedom of information laws (Grigorescu 2003; UNDP 2004; Florini 2002; Héritier 
2003). However, studies have shown that these laws are ineffective in settings where political 
will is lacking (Neuman & Calland). Studies have shown that the effective implementation of 
transparency requires officials to see the benefits of transparency (Neuman & Calland; Gill & 
Hughes 2005). According to Neuman & Calland: “The notion of transparency is invariably far 
beyond the range of experience and mind-set of most public bureaucrats. Therefore, a 
fundamental mind shift is necessary, prefaced with political will for a change in approach. As 
Florini (2002:4) argues: “the degree of transparency that prevails is the result of deliberate 
choices. Governments must choose to release information”. 
A focus on formal transparency laws also directs scholarly attention to a certain 
type of theories of norm diffusion. It helps preserve the traditional focus of international 
relations studies that treat governments and countries as homogenous entities (that can 
determine the costs and benefits of implementing certain laws, that can decide to adopt laws 
in order to reinstall public confidence and enhance their legitimacy etc.). The downside of this 
approach is that it may not adequately consider the fact that different parts of the government 
bureaucracy may have different preferences and norms and that both the adoption of new laws 
and their implementability are dependent upon the will and norms of subgroups of 
bureaucrats. Some groups of bureaucrats may, for instance, be less dependent upon gaining 
public legitimacy, but nonetheless important and influential in the process by which 
governments change. If governments are not homogenous entities and if laws do not always 
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get implemented correctly, bureaucrats’ experiences and norms do matter. Thus, theories 
about how transparency norms are diffused should include their influence on bureaucrats’ 
perceptions of transparency.  
How can we then understand the decisions leading up to transparency being 
adopted as a normative principle by national bureaucrats? Given the fact that key bureaucrats 
have to decide whether or not to increase the level of transparency in their bureaucracies 
(Cary 2009), it is surprising that more research has not been conducted on what influences 
bureaucrats’ decision-making. The way in which IOs influence bureaucrats’ perceptions of 
transparency is under-theorized, and consequently their effects are poorly understood. In this 
paper we compare the perceptions of bureaucrats in two different international settings in 
order to understand their attitudes toward transparency norms. The paper suggests that it is 
possible that negative experiences with transparency in an international setting have negative 
effects on officials’ appraisal of transparency. Before developing our theoretical framework 
further, we turn to the two cases used to explore this thesis.  
 
 
The Transparency of International Systems 
We define IO transparency as the amount of information that is publicly 
available about a project seeking finance from the international system before decisions are 
made. We are thus interested in how much project information is made available before 
decisions are taken. This definition is practical because it specifies the type of information and 
level of accessibility that the term implies. It also addresses a criticism found in the literature, 
namely that definitions of transparency are usually very broad (Kolstad & Wiig 2009; Relly & 
Sabharwal 2009). This is because transparency is often vaguely defined as the level of access 
to information without narrowing down what information and which access. Broad definitions 
tend to favour a largely positive reading of transparency, for example equating the term with 
accountability, which may not always hold true in practice (Kolstad & Wiig 2009). Instead, 
our definition is more narrow and neutral. 
The transparency within different IOs have been the focus of many studies. 
Florini (1999), for example, traces the changes in the level of transparency in the World Bank 
and the IMF, arguing that the World Bank has come the furthest in opening up their work to 
outside scrutiny. Despite this greater transparency, Florini poses the question about whether 
these international organizations are transparent enough to be credible in promoting 
transparency in member states. She thereby implies that greater IO transparency increases the 
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rate of success of spreading transparency domestically. This is in line with conventional 
wisdom that IOs should lead by example (Grigorescu 2002). However, the question of 
whether more transparency in IO proceedings always facilitates the diffusion of transparency 
norms to member states has received surprisingly little attention in empirical studies.  
 This paper outlines a study that focuses on how transparency interacts and 
coexists with decision making qualities in two different IO programs: the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol. Both systems are part of important international environmental regimes – the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Montreal Protocol respectively. These systems are responsible for significant 
financial transfers between countries with important implications for how we succeed in 
protecting global public goods.  
The CDM is run under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The CDM is the first global market mechanism in international 
environmental law and the world’s largest offset market (Streck 2004). The CDM was 
adopted to function as a “win win” strategy to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions while 
aiding developing countries achieve sustainable development. This was to be achieved by 
investing in emission reducing projects in developing countries that would not have been 
implemented without the additional incentive offered by the CDM. These emission reductions 
would then be translated into Certified Emission Reductions (CERs or carbon credits) which 
could subsequently be used by Annex I countries (those countries that have emission 
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol) or private firms as an alternative to domestic 
emission reductions.. It is the responsibility of the CDM Executive Board, the UN agency 
supervising the CDM, to decide on the eligibility of project applications. However, before this 
UN body can approve or reject these projects, a national government authority, the so called 
Designated National Authority (DNA), has to approve projects and certify that they are in line 
with national sustainable development goals.  
The CDM has some level of similarity to another international environmental 
mechanism – the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol. This 
Fund was established in 1990 with the objective of aiding developing (Article 5) countries to 
comply with their obligations to phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) under 
the Montreal Protocol. The Multilateral Fund is administered by a number of implementing 
agencies, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP). The fund is managed by the Executive Committee, a body 
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which for the 2009-2011 period oversees $490 million1. The Executive Committee, similar to 
the Executive Board of the CDM, is responsible for developing criteria and guidelines for 
eligibility and for the approval of project applications.2 Before this board approves projects 
they have generally been approved by the National Focal Points.  
 Although more and more IOs strive to increase transparency in their 
programmes3, few reach up to the level of transparency found in the CDM (Bäckstrand 2008). 
The level of access to information about projects before EB decisions are made is higher than 
in most other IO systems. Project developers must provide project design documents (PDDs) 
that are posted on the CDM website. These PDDs must contain information about the 
rationale for the project, including a description of how it meets the additionality criterion. 
Moreover, stakeholder comments, including negative viewpoints about the project, should be 
included. It is based on these documents that the CDM Executive Board approves or rejects 
projects.4  
 The CDM and the multilateral fund differs in the level of international mass medial 
and NGO attentions that they receive. Despite the fact that  the World Bank has lauded the 
CDM a success (World Bank 2008:4), the CDM has increasingly become the object of 
criticism for allegedly failing to live up to its objectives (McCully 2008). Wara and Victor for 
example find that “Experience with the CDM suggests that many CDM projects do not reflect 
real reductions in emissions (Wara & Victor 2008:23).” Thus it does not appear that the 
transparency in the system has deterred project developers from applying for CDM money on 
faulty basis5. In contrast to the CDM, the Multilateral Fund has received less attention and the 
attention that it has received has been primarily positive6.   
The high media attention of the CDM can partly be explained by the controversial 
nature of the policy area. Perhaps because of the fact that no offsets are involved in the 
Multilateral Fund, i.e. industrialized countries are not entitled to let out more ODS as a result 
of the reductions that take place in developing countries, the high levels of transparency 
                                                 
1 http://www.multilateralfund.org  
2 One difference with the CDM is that the Multilateral Fund has a more centralised structure than the market 
based mechanism for greenhouse gas reductions.  
3 (See for example http://go.worldbank.org/TRCDVYJ440 about the current reform of the World Bank’s 
disclosure policy towards a more transparent organization 
4 In order to make sure that real emission reductions occur, it is therefore important to verify that CDM projects 
would not have happened anyway. This concept is known as “additionality” and is a key criterion for valid CDM 
projects. The additionality principle is thus fundamental to the integrity of the CDM system because if projects 
are approved that would have taken place even without the money obtained through the CDM, the result is an 
increase in GHG emissions 
5 See also Schneider (2007) who calculates that about 40% of the registered projects by July 2007 may have been 
implemented even in the absence of the CDM mechanism, contrary to the objective of the CDM. 
6 For criticism about the implementing agencies (particularly the World Bank), see Greenpeace 1994. 
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required in the CDM system have not been an issue for the Fund. This may provide one 
explanation as to why media scrutiny of projects has been far off from the high levels of the 
CDM.  
Better access to information about projects before decisions are made allows for a 
particular type of media and NGO scrutiny. It allows for targeted campaigns against specific 
projects. . Because critics have access to extensive details about projects before they are 
considered for approval, targeted campaigns against particular projects can sometimes be 
successful. NGO representatives have for example on several occasions’ submitted comments 
about projects that they argue could not be considered eligible for CDM funding.  
 How does this affect national bureaucrats’ perceptions of transparency? Can the 
different systems influence the way in which the national bureaucrats working with them 
appraise the merits and drawbacks of transparency? We suggest that the difference in IO 
decision making, the level of transparency and media scrutiny can lead national bureaucrats to 
have different experiences with transparency, which in turn can influence their support for the 
transparency norm.  
Project overseers in both the CDM and the Multilateral Fund are generally from 
the same set of countries and are professionals that are based in the Ministry of Environment 
or an equivalent department in most cases. Participants in our study are senior officials in 
their home countries that administer and approve projects.We develop our theoretical 
expectations below. 
 
 
How International Organizations Influence Domestic Transparency 
 
International organizations (IOs), such as the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF, champion 
the spread of transparency to member countries because of the benefits expected from 
implementing this norm (Florini 2002). No consensus exists, however, about why and how 
this norm is sometimes endorsed by member states. Studies on norm diffusion from IOs to 
member states tend to focus on other concepts such as corruption (Sandholtz & Gray 2003) or 
minority rights (Kelley 2004), with few empirical studies on how IOs can influence domestic 
transparency (Grigorescu 2002).  
 The literature on what factors spur domestic support for transparency norms 
typically conceives of support for the transparency norm as part of a wider complex of 
attitudes and norms relating to democratisation and accountability. Thus, members of the 
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bureaucracy or politicians that support or advocate greater government transparency may do 
so based on a general conviction of the importance of greater accountability and 
democratisation. Alternatively they may be pressured into supporting greater transparency in 
order to counter criticism. The causality between different motives for supporting 
transparency norms is difficult to tease out however.  
The literature points out international organizations as a source of potentially 
strong influence over reforms in member states. Examples of tools that IOs have at their 
disposal to put pressure on governments include conditionality for aid, loans or membership, 
but also less tangible mechanisms such as the production and use of rankings of government 
performance and IO led workshop and capacity building projects (Bauhr & Nasiritousi 2009; 
Bearce & Bondanella 2007; Kapur & Naim 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005; Sandholtz & Gray 
2003; Jacoby 2006; Kelley 2004; Rotberg 2004-2005; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). IOs may 
for instance make aid or loans conditional on countries adopting transparency laws.  
Several studies point at the limited effect of conditionality. Neuman and Calland 
argue that this mechanism does not lead to the effective implementation of transparency in a 
country. Their review of countries that have adopted transparency laws shows that the set of 
countries that simply adopt access to information laws as a response to pressure from IOs 
does not have a good track record of effective implementation of transparency. The reason for 
this, as can be seen in the case of Nicaragua and Honduras, is that there is not the necessary 
demand for transparency within these countries. Instead countries resort to window-dressing 
in order to satisfy conditionality demands from the World Bank and the IMF (Neuman & 
Calland). In fact, it has been shown that when there is little domestic demand for 
transparency, access to information laws that have been introduced top-down often fail to 
produce any benefits (Neuman & Calland). Thus IO efforts to increase transparency by 
simply placing it as a condition in an aid agreement do not provide the right conditions for the 
effective implementation of transparency in those countries. 
 The literature on the influence of international organizations on national 
transparency, or other good governance norms, often points to the importance of international 
organizations embodying these norms themselves in their dealing with member states 
(Grigorescu 2002; Woods 2000). Nevertheless, these very organizations have only recently 
begun to open up their activities to greater scrutiny by outsiders and sometimes only 
reluctantly so (Florini 2002). Although much of the literature seems to assume or agree that 
IO transparency is important for its ability to influence member states, few studies attempt to 
understand how it matters. Some studies somewhat vaguely argue for the importance of 
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international organizations gaining moral credibility (Florini 1999). IO transparency can also 
increase the effectiveness of other strategies of influence, such as conditionality. Grigorescu 
(2002) shows for example that normative persuasion is an ineffective mechanism for IOs to 
spread norms in cases when the IOs themselves have not implemented the norm. This could 
be viewed in the case of EU attempts to increase transparency in accession states. Because the 
EU does itself not always practice the transparency principle and because its existing member 
states also are not always open, it became difficult to persuade accession countries that they 
should become more open (Grigorescu 2002).   
One of few elaborate attempts to understand how, more precisely, IO 
transparency matters is Grigorescu’s (2003) study on impacts of IO publicity requirements on 
member state transparency. Grigorescu (2003) shows that IOs have indirectly spread the 
transparency norm by making available member country information that could not be 
accessed domestically. The provision of an alternative source of information by IOs has 
reduced the costs of transparency for domestic governments as the information is readily 
available anyways. Moreover, if information publicized by IOs is used to criticize the 
government, decision-makers may resort to transparency laws in order to bolster government 
legitimacy and support. Grigorescu thus finds that IOs have an important role to play in 
encouraging greater transparency, through reducing the costs associated with the 
implementation of access to information laws. Grigorescu’s (2003) conclusion that IOs should 
expand transparency within their own organizations in order to spread the norm to member 
countries focuses on an indirect link between the level of information made available by IOs 
and the extent of access to information laws in a country.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the possibility of a direct link between experience of IO 
systems and perceptions of transparency is rarely explored. When outlining his mechanism, 
Grigorescu dismisses the possibility of a direct link between participation in IOs and norm 
diffusion (2003).7 The literature on norm diffusion, however, argues that IOs have an 
important role to play in spreading norms to national bureaucrats that interact with IOs 
(Johnston 2001; Checkel 2001; Alderson 2001). Although it is likely that this effect is smaller 
than national socialization (Hooghe 2005), studies show that experience based shifts in 
attitudes can come about as a result of appreciation of or disillusionment with certain policies 
                                                 
7 “The hypothesized role of IOs in increasing government transparency is not one of the traditional ones often 
attributed to IOs: such as ‘‘condition-setters’’ (e.g., Schmitter, 1996:29–31) (emphasized by realists) or ‘‘norms 
exporters’’ (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Checkel, 2000) (on which the constructivist literature generally 
focuses). Such mechanisms are not yet in place. IOs have set down only very weak conditions with regard to 
transparency for their members or prospective members” (Grigorescu 2003:649) 
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(Markus 1979). Thus, although socialization is a long and complex process, and consequently 
very difficult to study empirically, experience based shifts in attitudes may form a central part 
of the mechanism by which interaction with IOs influence perceptions of transparency. We 
suggest that personal experience provides another mean through which IOs can affect 
transparency in member countries. Our personal experience model thus contends that national 
bureaucrats that participate in IO settings do not only learn about the particular norms that are 
promoted by IOs, as suggested by normative persuasion theory, but also learn from 
experiences with those norms as applied in international settings8. This forms our first 
theoretical expectation: Personal experience with IOs’ decision making processes may 
influence perceptions of the merits and drawbacks of transparency. 
Studies typically contend that if international organizations do at all have an 
influence on governments, this influence is generally a positive one. In line with this view, 
greater transparency in IOs would mean that national bureaucrats who interact with 
international organizations will be socialized into having more positive attitudes about 
transparency. However, we argue that the personal experiences of IO decision making among 
national bureaucrats who interact with international organizations can determine international 
organizations’ influence on national decision making either in a positive or a negative 
direction. In order to understand how the norm can be perceived by those involved in 
transparent proceedings, it is important to review theories on what transparency is meant to 
achieve, as well as its potential limits.  
Although the merits of transparency are well-known, its potential limits have 
been less explored. Studies disagree for instance on questions such as whether transparency is 
indeed a cure against corruption, whether transparency leads to increased legitimacy/trust in 
institutions, and whether transparency in fact increases the quality of policies. Given the 
complexities and potential drawback of transparency, the personal experience with 
transparency that interaction with international organizations promotes is not necessarily a 
positive one. Recent studies have pointed out that transparency is a double-edged sword that 
can on the one hand be an important tool for achieving good governance and on the other be 
misused and have negative consequences. Therefore, experiences with transparency may be 
different in different settings. Thus while IOs may provide a forum where national delegates 
                                                 
8 It develops Grigorescu’s (2002) model by looking at how transparent IO settings can lead to norm diffusion. 
Even though Grigorescu (2002) could not find any effects on transparency of EU involvement, we suggest that 
his result may have been different had he studied the perceptions of accession country bureaucrats on 
transparency before and after EU entry. 
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can learn about the values of norms such as transparency, this learning experience can equally 
be a negative one by increasing resistance against this norm under certain conditions.  
In the next section we specify the conditions under which IOs can influence 
experiences about the effects of transparency. These two conditions, and the way they are 
related are discussed in the section below. 
 
The Importance of Effective, Predictable and Fair International Organizations 
 
We suggest that the influence of transparency on the quality of IO decision 
making, such as the effectiveness and predictability of decisions, is potentially of central 
importance for their ability to promote support for transparency. International organizations 
make decisions about and distribute large sums of money, and perceptions of the impartiality 
and predictability of these decisions could be expected to be of importance to recipients. Good 
governance principles, such as accountability, participation and transparency, thus not only 
apply to national governments, but to the work of IOs themselves (Woods 2000). 
However, few studies look at the effects of these norms when they interact in an 
international setting. We pose the question of how transparency is perceived by national 
bureaucrats if it is seen to interfere with other desirable outcomes of IO decision making, such 
as effectiveness, predictability and fairness. It is argued below that depending on how 
transparency affects the quality of decision making in IO settings, bureaucrats’ perceptions of 
transparency could change in a favorable or an unfavorable direction.9   
Transparency is typically believed to improve decision making. Islam (2006) 
and Stiglitz (2003) for example argue that transparency improves the quality of decisions and 
leads to better allocation of resources and thereby increases social welfare. By increasing 
available information, transparency is believed to lead to better analysis and monitoring of 
risk, thus contributing to good governance (OECD 2001). However, studies also point to the 
negative sides of increased transparency for decision-making. For instance, deterioration in 
the quality of decisions is predicted if transparency provides officials with an incentive to 
posture or pander (Stasavage 2004:672-73), or if it increases transaction costs and leads to 
greater politicization (Heald 2003; MacCoun 2006; Fenster 2006). Jacobsson and Vifell 
(2003) reach a similar conclusion in their study of institutions within the EU, stating that “the 
                                                 
9 In particular, three different factors may determine whether impartial decision making is possible: whether the 
policy and regulatory framework is clear, whether decision makers have a preference for certain individuals, and 
quality in publicity.  
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more closed the forum, the more openness in discussion”. Thus transparency may inhibit good 
decision-making if officials are hindered from deliberating openly due to fears of citizens’ 
perceptions of their actions.  
In the case of deciding which projects that should be approved in an IO, it is 
possible therefore that transparency either increases or decreases the quality of decision-
making. This is because interference from outside parties may either aid in providing relevant 
information on which the decisions are based, or it may disrupt impartial decision-making. 
The latter scenario is possible if transparency forces the decision-making body to reject 
projects that receive massive criticism even if they are not perceived to be worse than projects 
that receive no or little criticism and are approved. The (real or perceived) increase in 
unpredictability of decisions as a result of a great level of transparency in the system could 
influence perceptions of the merits of transparency. If greater transparency is blamed for the 
decreased quality in the decision-making, “decision control” and procedural fairness theory 
(Thibaut & Walker 1975)10 suggest that the reactions could be negative. These theories imply 
that the acceptability of decisions is based on how predictable and fair they are.  
One of the reasons why the Quality of decision making can influence 
perceptions of transparency is that it is likely to influence perceptions of publicity, defined as 
how balanced, fair and knowledgeable media and NGOs are perceived to be when using the 
information made available by international organizations. Bureaucrats’ perceptions of quality 
of publicity may influence support for the transparency norm in several ways. Bureaucrats’ 
involved in a system with bad quality of decision making may be heavily critiqued and 
thereby cultivate a more adversarial relation to the media and NGOs. If this critique does not 
contribute to effective and fair decisions or even undermines such decisions the adversarial 
relation may increase. For instance, publicity may both improve and reduce the quality of 
decision making. The standard view of transparency is that it is negatively correlated with 
corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Montinola & Jackman 2002, Gerring & Thacker 2004, 
IMF 2001, UNODC 2004, Reinikka & Svensson 2005, Kaufmann et al. 2002). Transparency 
is believed to reduce corruption by facilitating the detection of corrupt practices. Other 
scholars, however, show that this relationship is not perfect and that a set of conditions must 
be fulfilled before transparency can be an effective tool against corruption (Olken 2004, 
Lindstedt and Naurin forthcoming, Bac 2001). Bac (2001), for instance, argues that while a 
transparent system may detect corruption, transparency may also facilitate the localization of 
                                                 
10Cf. Esaiasson (2009:2-10) 
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bureaucrats to bribe. If the system is not open enough to withstand this effect of new avenues 
to find targets to bribe, the effect may be greater corruption instead of less. Thus there needs 
to be a strong accountability mechanism and good IO decision making quality in the system 
for transparency to be effective against corruption. Similarly, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argue 
that making information available to the press does not always mean that this will be used for 
the purposes of combating corruption. Instead they warn that “the media may concoct false 
allegations to increase profits, or use information to get access to rents” (2009:526). 
Thus the literature on the effects of transparency on corruption predicts that 
corruption and fraud may either increase or decrease as a result of greater transparency, 
depending upon the quality of publicity and whether or not decision makers act on the 
information received. Transparency may reduce the number of fraudulent project applications 
if it contributes to detecting them. The risk of being detected has a deterrent effect. However, 
in the more pessimistic scenario, transparency may also increase corruption if it is coupled 
with inadequate support for a clean system. This could happen for instance if there are 
frequent allegations of fraudulent projects that do not get acted upon. This signals a limited 
effect of critique and very low risk of sanctions which may pave the way for more fraudulent 
applications. After all, if the risk of being “caught” is minimal despite a widespread 
knowledge of faults and gaps in project applications, it may seem risk-free to file applications 
that do not live up to all standards. Thus in order for quality in publicity to reduce corruption 
and fraud, the information has to get acted upon.  
Publicity may also affect support for transparency through its influence on 
public legitimacy. Again the literature predicts two opposite effects of transparent decision-
making, this time on how it influences the legitimacy of institutions. Whereas greater 
transparency is believed to increase legitimacy, it is possible that citizens with an insight into 
how decisions are made become disillusioned instead. Bovens (2003) argues that with a 
media that live off scandals, trust in institutions can decrease as a result of an open system. 
Moreover, information may fall into the wrong hands and be used against the purposes of 
openness. Hultman and Axelsson (2007) show that increasing transparency in the absence of 
trust may lead to unpredictability and negative outcomes. So the experience of national 
bureaucrats who participate in IO application procedures in terms of whether transparency 
increases or decreases legitimacy of their projects could be another factor that influences their 
perceptions of quality in publicity and consequently their support for the transparency norm. 
If IO transparency leads to projects becoming the target of significant media criticism, it is 
conceivable that national bureaucrats involved in the system feel that all projects loose in 
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legitimacy in the eyes of the public. When media reports to a great extent are critical of a 
particular IO program, national bureaucrats may fear that all projects associated with this 
system are perceived as being bad by the public, resulting in reduced legitimacy for all types 
of projects – even “good” ones. 11 
The causal processes outlined in the preceding sections lead us to expect that the 
quality of IO decision making may influence perceptions of publicity, in that it can create a 
more adversarial relationship between officials and NGOs.  Second we expect that 
bureaucrats who perceive media attention as unfair and imbalanced are less in favor of 
transparency. 
Applied to our two cases, this model predicts that we should find variations in 
how national bureaucrats perceive the merits and drawbacks of transparency. This is because 
the stringent transparency requirements of the CDM affect the quality of IO decision making 
and the perceptions of publicity. Although it is true that transparency has been successful in 
bringing attention to fraudulent CDM applications, not all of these reports get acted upon. 
This either means that the critical reports that do not lead to a rejection of the discussed 
project are incorrect or that the Executive Board responsible for the decision-making chooses 
not to take action. The CDM Executive Board, which has enforcement tools at its disposal, 
has stepped up its efforts to root out fraudulent CDMs. The number of rejected projects has in 
fact risen in recent years. However, the resources of the Executive Board are limited and the 
increasing number of CDM projects in the pipeline adds to the pressure of spending less time 
ensuring the validity of each project (Schneider 2007:6). This creates the risk that the 
predictability of CDM decisions is affected if officials perceive that the Executive Board rely 
on media or NGO comments to approve or reject projects due to their limited resources to 
review all project applications themselves. This in turn could affect project developers’ 
perception of the fairness of CDM decisions. This is because transparency is expected to 
improve the quality of organizations’ decisions, i.e. by countering corruption and making 
systems more predictable (Islam 2006). If transparency leads to a situation instead where 
project developers feel that the decisions made are based on unbalanced outside pressure, the 
experience with transparency could be negative. 
 
                                                 
11 Other drawbacks of transparency that are present for most cases are resource and information generation costs. 
Transparency includes both monetary and human resources costs that can be significant (Grigorescu 2003; 
Fenster 2006; Neuman & Calland 2007; Roberts 2006; Florini 2002). Consequently, there are real costs of 
transparency that must be taken into consideration in an analysis of the desirability of increasing transparency in 
a given bureaucracy.  
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The Study 
 
In Spring 2010, a surveys was launched to government officials working on the Clean 
Development Mechanism and the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal 
protocol. The participants of this study are senior officials in their respective administrations 
working either in the Designated National Authorities (DNA) of the CDM system or in the 
National Focal Points of the Montreal Protocol. Participants received an introductory letter 
followed by an email with an online version of the survey, devised in English, Spanish or 
French.12 This survey is complemented with interviews with a number of experts, NGO and 
IO representatives, government administrators, and business representatives. 
 The survey asks participants to answer questions about their perceptions of IO 
decision making quality, quality in publicity, and attitudes towards transparency. The 
measurement strategy of capturing national bureaucrats’ perceptions of transparency thus 
consists of three tracks. The first track explores the bureaucrats’ perceptions of the decision 
making quality of IOs. This set of questions asks respondents about their perceptions of 
decision making in the Executive Board and the Executive Committee respectively in terms of 
impartiality, predictability, timeliness and fairness of decision making. The second track 
explores whether bureaucrats perceive media and NGO attention as unfair and imbalanced. 
These questions pertain to the nature of publicity in terms of whether media and NGOs are 
generally balanced or biased in their reporting of the work of the IO and whether they have a 
tendency to misrepresent or misuse information. The third track explores perceptions of the 
merits and drawbacks of transparency..13 Results will be available in early autumn 2010. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper outlines a theory that suggests that the effectiveness and fairness of international 
organizations’ decision making affect national bureaucrats’ perceptions of the merits and 
drawbacks of transparency. Drawing on insights from the extensive transparency literature 
and from theories of norm diffusion, we suggest that national bureaucrats working with 
international organizations can learn about the practical implications of important norms 
embodied by these organizations. This proposition is explored among bureaucrats in 
developing countries working on the international transfer of resources in the environmental 
                                                 
12 To reduce the risk of language difficulties influencing the responses the survey was devised in English, French 
and Spanish 
13 See Appendix I for an example of the survey. 
 20
field. Two different systems for resource transfer are included in the study: the Clean 
Development Mechanism and the Multilateral Fund. A pilot study provides consistent support 
for our theory. 
If these propositions hold up in our study, it challenges and complements the 
established literature which ascribes a positive link between greater IO transparency and 
domestic transparency (Grigorescu 2003; Grigorescu 2002; Woods 2000; Florini 1999) by 
specifying how and under what conditions this effect is likely to appear. Furthermore, 
contrary to important parts of the literature on norm diffusion that use the adoption of laws as 
an indicator of norm diffusion (Grigorescu 2003; UNDP 2004; Florini 2002; Héritier 2003), 
we suggest an agency focused model, where bureaucrats’ perceptions of transparency are 
based on experiences of transparency in their work.  
This study thus suggests that an understanding of the effects of reforms, such as 
the current global drive for greater transparency in international organizations and 
governments alike, requires an analysis of the link between different institutional qualities, 
and how they interact. This paper has developed and elaborated the link between transparency 
and effectiveness, predictability and fairness in decision making, arguing that the two can 
interact in ways that may not be conducive to promoting greater domestic transparency. The 
implication from this is not that IOs should exercise less transparency in order to increase 
support for the transparency norm among bureaucrats. Instead, it implies that the IO should 
try to mitigate against the negative experiences of transparency by for example strengthening 
rules concerning impartiality. Our study of the CDM and the MF therefore highlights the 
importance of designing sound systems not only in terms of their environmental effects but 
also their potential influence on institutions. Given the strong link between environmental 
integrity and adequate domestic and international institutions, it is important to gain a better 
understanding of how systems designed to protect global public goods may also influence 
global institutional development.  
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